


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*Rhodesia: Some Ethnic and Demographic
Pitfalls for a Majority Government*

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Summary and Principal Conclusions

A majority government in Rhodesia will have its hands full coping with the tribal antagonisms that, although currently overshadowed by the black-white conflict, already badly divide the black nationalist movement. The outlook for uniting the factions behind a single leader is not promising. The success of a majority government will be further challenged by instability caused by the combination of a rapidly growing population, rising unemployment, and increasing black migration produced by the removal of urban and rural segregation barriers.

- Each of the two principal black nationalist movements, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU), has mustered majority support from one of the two major tribal clusters, the Shona and the Ndebele. The Shona dominate ZANU, the Ndebele dominate ZAPU.
- Warfare between two Shona tribes, the Karanga and the Manyika, has divided the ZANU ranks. The Karanga currently control the party and hope to retain their power in a majority government.
- The 23 to 1 ratio of blacks to whites will continue to widen as the pace of the white exodus quickens. The economy will worsen and unemployment will rise as the whites depart.
- Blacks already outnumber whites by at least 3 to 1 in all cities and towns. The movement of blacks from the surrounding townships, where they are presently confined, into the urban cores will hasten white departures.
- Land will be reallocated by a majority government, but because the economy is heavily dependent on commercial production from white farms, the new government will be reluctant to turn over large areas to black homesteaders. Population pressures in the tribal areas, however, could trigger spontaneous migration and speed the departure of white farmers.
- Rural to urban migration will continue under a majority government even though new lands are open to black settlement. Urban overcrowding, with all of its associated problems, will persist.

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CHRONOLOGY

- A.D. 1000 Shona tribes from central Africa begin to settle in Rhodesia.
Shona empires rule the region.
- 1820 Ndebele tribes enter Rhodesia from the south and begin to subjugate Shona tribes.
- 1888 British South Africa Company granted mineral rights in Matabeleland.
- 1890 Whites begin to settle.
- 1897 White settlers suppress Ndebele and Shona rebellions.
- 1923 Rhodesia becomes a self-governing colony of the British Commonwealth.
- 1961 Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) is formed.
- 1962 ZAPU is outlawed.
- 1963 Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is formed.
- 1964 ZANU is outlawed. Nationalist leaders are jailed.
- 1965 Rhodesia issues unilateral declaration of independence from the British Commonwealth.
- 1971 African National Council (ANC) is formed.
- 1976 Rhodesian government agrees to majority rule by March 1978.

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RHODESIA: SOME ETHNIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC PITFALLS FOR A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT

Rhodesia's white minority government and the black nationalist leaders that have challenged it have agreed that the successor state of Zimbabwe will attain independence under majority rule by 1 March 1978. If majority rule is in fact attained by this date, the new government will have to contend with tribal-based divisions that continue to fragment the nationalist movement. Alliances among nationalist leaders at the Geneva negotiations belie serious differences. There are significant conflicts not only between the two major tribal clusters, the Shona and the Ndebele, but among the six major Shona tribes. The nationalist factions (which are closely related to tribal divisions) have shown no signs of willingness to unite behind a single leader, and no single faction has the numerical, political, or military strength to assume the reins of the government without challenge. Factionalism will not disappear in the foreseeable future; a new government must somehow placate tribal leaders in order to ensure a stable regime.

Once in power, a majority government must also deal with increasing population pressures. Blacks in the overpopulated tribal lands will pressure the government to open up white areas, both urban and rural. But, because the commercial white farms are a significant contributor to the agriculture-based economy, the government will be reluctant to permit large numbers of black farmers to move into the areas formerly denied to them. The flow of blacks from the tribal lands to the cities is already surpassing the capacity of the municipalities to provide jobs and housing. Unemployment and housing shortages will probably become more severe under a majority government. Dissatisfaction among impoverished farmers and unemployed and homeless urban dwellers could be a destabilizing factor for the new government.

NOTE: This paper was produced by the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and questions may be directed to

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Ethnic Factors

The Rhodesian black population is more homogeneous than those in most African countries. Although anthropologists have identified more than 40 tribes, principal divisions are only two—the Shona (also called Mashona) and the Ndebele (pronounced en-dab-ee-lee, commonly called Matabele).* These two tribal clusters dominate the nationalist movement. Shona comprise more than 70 percent of the black population. Although they live in all parts of the country, their numerical strength is in the east. Ndebele account for only about 16 percent and are concentrated in the west. Small tribes—the Tonga, Sena, Hlengwe, Venda, Sotho, and others—live in peripheral areas and have played only minor roles in black nationalist politics. Non-indigenous black workers from Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique are scattered throughout the country. They are a diminishing element and not involved in nationalist politics. The population inset map following the text shows the distribution of the principal tribes. Tribal composition, according to language, is shown in Table 1.

History of Settlement: A Tribal Crossroads

The Shona were among the waves of Bantu tribes that migrated from central to southern Africa several centuries ago. A series of Shona empires controlled much of Rhodesia before the Ndebele and white colonists arrived in the 19th century. Although the Shona tribes have both linguistic and cultural affinities, they have remained distinct and have never integrated into a single nation. Anthropologists usually divide them into six major tribes—the Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru, Korekore, Ndau, and Kalanga. There are a number of sub-tribes within

* Shona is a derogatory term, meaning unknown, applied to them by the Ndebele. Ndebele is a term, believed to mean "naked people with shields," applied to them by the Sotho tribe. Many white Rhodesians identify themselves as "white Shona" or "white Ndebele," depending on their place of birth.

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TABLE 1
Mid-1976 Tribal Composition

Tribal Group	Number of Persons *
Shona	Shona ** 1,617,000
	Karanga 964,000
	Zezuru 833,000
	Manyika 448,000
	Ndau 230,000
	Korekore 187,000
	Kalanga 112,000
	Other 13,000
Total Shona	4,404,000
Ndebele	
Zansi	147,000
	Enhla 246,000
	Holi (Lozwi) 590,000
Total Ndebele	983,000
Other (includes Sena, Tonga, Venda, Sotho, Hlengwe, and aliens from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia)	833,000
Total Tribal Population	6,220,000

* Figures extrapolated from 1969 census data.

** Persons identifying as Shona in the 1969 census rather than one of the Shona tribes.

each. There is not, however, full agreement on these tribal and sub-tribal groupings. For example, the Kalanga are considered by some to be an independent tribe with closer links to the Ndebele than to the Shona; some authorities think the Tonga comprise a distinctive tribe, while others believe they belong to the Shona cluster.

Pressed by the military might of Zulu warriors and Boer frontiersmen in South Africa, the Ndebele first entered Shona territory in the 1820s. They were stronger than the larger but scattered and weak Shona tribes and subjugated or absorbed most of them during the middle decades of the century. Today's Ndebele-Shona antipathy was born. The formidable military power of the Ndebele has been reduced to legend by more than three-quarters of a century of white rule.

Whites first appeared in Rhodesia in large numbers after 1888 when Cecil Rhodes' British South African Company signed an agreement with the Ndebele king

that granted all mineral rights in Matabeleland to the company. White prospecting, mining, and farming extended farther and farther into the Shona and Ndebele tribal lands in the 1890s, leading to clashes between the frontiersmen and the tribesmen. Shona and Ndebele rebellions were suppressed and white rule was absolute by 1897. Since the colonists considered the Ndebele to be the more intelligent and diligent of the two groups, they were more quickly educated and drawn into the labor force.

The Ndebele are more united than the Shona even though many of the Ndebele are descendants of subjugated tribes that were absorbed into Ndebele society. The Ndebele are divided into three "castes." Members of the highest caste (Zansi) are descendants of the original conquerors from South Africa. They are considered the "real" Ndebele, undiluted by intermarriage. They comprise about 15 percent of all Ndebele. Members of the Enhla caste are descendants of Sotho stock absorbed by the Ndebele during their 19th century northward migration. They form an estimated 25 percent of all Ndebele. The lowest 60 percent—called Holi or Lozwi—are derived from Shona and other tribes subjugated by the Ndebele after they arrived in Rhodesia. They became serfs and were denied full tribal membership by the other two castes. Distinctions among the castes, although blurred over the years, remain a significant element in Ndebele society and have created dissension within Ndebele-dominated nationalist groups. The critical distinction is between the Zansi and the other two castes.

The Nationalist Movement: Shona Versus Ndebele

Black leaders claim that Rhodesian whites exaggerate differences between the Shona and Ndebele, among the Shona tribes, and among the Ndebele castes. Although tribal biases do indeed fragment the nationalist movement, more than 75 years of white rule have reduced tribal distinctions. Intertribal marriages have been common and tribal hybrids may be the rule rather than the exception. Some nationalist leaders are products of mixed marriages. Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, founder of the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union, is the son of an Ndebele father and a mixed Shona (Ndau)-Ndebele mother. Although he identifies primarily as an Ndau, he speaks both languages and is comfortable in either culture.

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According to black leaders, factional disagreements among the nationalist groups are caused less by tribal differences than by personality differences among the leaders. The blacks charge that the white government has encouraged the view that only the presence of whites has suppressed tribal bloodshed. They argue that geography, economics, education, and religion divide the black community more than tribal affiliations and that tribal divisions will not prevent the establishment of a viable majority government.

Despite the claims of the black leaders, no single nationalist organization has been able to transcend tribal rivalries. The principal factional divisions are the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). ZAPU was formed in 1961 by Joshua Nkomo, a Kalanga who is associated closely with the Ndebele. Reverend Sithole created ZANU in 1963. Both movements were banned and their leaders imprisoned from 1964 to 1974. The ZAPU-ZANU split, originally based more on personality and political differences than on tribal ones, has developed increasingly along tribal lines over the years. The Shona dominate both

the leadership and the rank and file of ZANU. ZAPU is less parochial: most of the officers are Ndebele, but several of Nkomo's top aides and many of the members are Shona.

Shona divisiveness within ZANU currently overshadows Shona-Ndebele differences in the overall nationalist movement. The Karanga, largest and most militant of the Shona tribes, have defeated the Manyika in a struggle for ZANU leadership in the past 2 years. They are now the dominant element in ZANU and in the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA, also called the "Third Force"), which has become its guerrilla arm.* The Manyika had held most key positions on the ZANU Central Committee until 1975

* The Karanga also provide about one-third of the blacks in the civil service and most of the black forces in the army and in the police. (Blacks outnumber whites by 2 to 1 in the army and 4 to 1 in the police.) The loyalty of the black counterinsurgent forces has been questioned. They may become increasingly reluctant to fight other blacks for fear of reprisals under a majority government and would probably be particularly hesitant to fight other Karanga in a confrontation with ZIPA forces. Some have already defected to the guerrillas.

MAJOR NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE'S UNION (ZAPU)

Founded in 1961 by Joshua Nkomo; banned in 1962.

Key Figure: Joshua Nkomo (Kalanga-Ndebele), president.

Tribal Composition: Total support of Zansi ("true") Ndebele; partial support from other Ndebele; support of most Kalanga; scattered support from other Shona tribes.

ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (ZANU)

Founded in 1963 as a more militant offshoot of ZAPU by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole; banned in 1964.

Key Figures: Ndabaningi Sithole (Ndebele-Ndau), President; Robert Mugabe (Zezuru), Secretary General; Josiah Tongora (Karanga), Defense Chief.

Tribal Composition: Karanga currently control the party; Zezuru and a few Ndebele provide much of the rank-and-file; Manyika are not currently a significant element.

The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA, also called the "Third Force") was initially formed as a combined ZANU-ZAPU guerrilla army; it has since become the fighting arm of ZANU.

AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (ANC)

Formed in 1971 as a legal, non-insurgent, nationalist group. ZAPU and ZANU were brought together under the ANC umbrella in 1974. The ANC split into two wings in 1975.

Key Figures: Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Manyika) heads one wing; Joshua Nkomo heads the other.

Tribal Composition: The Muzorewa wing has fragmented into Manyika and Zezuru elements. The Karanga are not well represented. Leadership and membership of the Nkomo wing is essentially the same as ZAPU.

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when clashes between Karanga and Manyika exiles in Zambia left Manyika leader Herbert Chitepo and more than 200 tribesmen dead and the Karanga in control of the party. A number of Karanga leaders were subsequently imprisoned in Zambia. ZANU Secretary General Robert Mugabe, a Zezuru who gets along well with the Karanga, has challenged Reverend Sithole for the leadership of the party; the real ZANU power may rest with the Karanga leaders recently released from prison in Zambia, principally with Josiah Tongogara, Defense Chief and leader of its most militant faction.

ZANU leaders have claimed that the 1975 clashes were politically motivated and had nothing to do with tribal differences. Others, including representatives of ZAPU, believe that there is little chance for a Karanga-Manyika reconciliation in ZANU. ZAPU members also believe that, if Karanga kill other Shonas within ZANU, there is little doubt that they would be willing to kill Ndebeles in ZAPU. It is the hope of Ndebele members of ZAPU that many members of Shona tribes that have lost power to the Karanga in ZANU—especially the Manyika—might be willing to switch their allegiance to ZAPU.

Intertribal squabbles within ZAPU have been neither as divisive nor as bloody as those within

ZANU. Tribal-based differences do, however, exist—particularly between Ndebele officers and Shona subordinates. Support for ZAPU among the Ndebele reflects "caste" divisions: "true" Ndebele are strong supporters while many members of the lower two castes support ZANU.

Efforts to unify ZAPU and ZANU under a broad nationalist umbrella have also succumbed to tribal factionalism. The African National Council (ANC) was formed in 1971 as a legal black nationalist movement under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, a Manyika. ZAPU and ZANU were brought together in a tenuous alliance under the ANC in 1974 but the union was short-lived. Joshua Nkomo's moderate wing and Bishop Muzorewa's more militant wing emerged in mid-1975. Membership of the Nkomo wing is essentially the same as ZAPU. The Muzorewa wing is distinct from ZANU but, like ZANU, is divided into tribal factions. The Manyika and the Zezuru are the main contestants for power; relatively few Karanga support the ANC.

Demographic Factors

The population of Rhodesia in mid-1976 was, according to official Rhodesian estimates, 6,528,500—6,220,000 Africans (blacks), 277,000 Europeans

TABLE 2

Populations of Principal Cities and Towns *

Towns (including suburbs)	Blacks	Whites	Asians	Coloreds	Total
Bindura	15,000	1,200	**	**	16,000
Bulawayo	270,000	59,700	2,700	7,800	340,000
Fort Victoria	16,000	2,900	200	300	19,000
Gatnomia	30,000	2,700	200	300	33,000
Gwelo	53,000	9,400	400	900	64,000
Hartley	11,000	700	**	**	12,000
Marandellas	17,000	2,400	**	**	19,000
Que Que	44,000	4,100	300	300	49,000
Redcliff	14,000	2,000	**	**	16,000
Salisbury	430,000	127,000	4,500	7,100	569,000
Shabani	15,000	1,900	**	100	17,000
Sinoia	18,000	2,000	200	**	20,000
Umtali	51,000	9,800	600	600	62,000
Wankie	25,000	2,800	**	100	28,000
Total	1,009,000	228,600	9,100	17,500	1,264,000

* Estimates as of 31 December 1975.

** Fewer than 50 persons.

Source: Rhodesian Central Statistical Office

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(whites), 21,400 coloreds (mixed), and 10,100 Asians (mostly Indians).* Most of the minority peoples live in the 14 towns and cities with populations of 10,000 or more—82 percent of the whites, 91 percent of the Asians, and 83 percent of the coloreds. Only 16 percent of the blacks are urbanized. Table 2 shows the populations, by race, of the principal cities and towns.

A Diminishing White Minority

The blacks outnumber the whites by a ratio of 23 to 1 and the gap is widening. Despite government efforts to boost the slow-growing white population, the country has failed to sustain the large-scale white immigration that prevailed for more than a decade after World War II. Net immigration has waxed and waned, depending on political and economic conditions, over the past 20 years (Table 3). The immigration surge in 1975 was caused by an exodus of whites from newly independent Mozambique and Angola into Rhodesia. The country registered a net loss of more than 5,000 whites during the first ten months of 1976 compared to a net gain of 1,930 in all of 1975. The 1,520 departures in August (910 net) was the largest monthly loss since 1966; the 480 immigrants in October were the fewest since 1965.

Faced with a heightened threat to their dominant social, economic, and political positions and an uncertain future under a majority government, the whites will undoubtedly leave at a mounting rate. (Kenya, a white settler colony that enjoyed a smooth transition to majority rule, experienced a surge of white departures during the years before and after independence. About 8,000 whites, out of a total population of 61,000, emigrated during the three-year period prior to independence in December 1963. Four thousand left in 1964, 7,000 in 1965). Many white Rhodesians in both urban and rural areas are making preparations to ease eventual emigration.

Social and economic constraints, however, will discourage a massive exodus. More than 40 percent of Rhodesia's whites were born there. Even most of the immigrants hold Rhodesian citizenship and consider

* Neither the coloreds nor Asians will be a significant force in a majority government. Most are Rhodesian-born and are citizens but retain and value their cultural identities. Despite their roots in the country, the Asians are frequently regarded as aliens by both blacks and whites. Their situation may be difficult under a black government.

TABLE 3

White Immigration and Emigration, 1955-1975

	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1955	14,000	6,000	+ 8,000
1956	19,000	8,000	+11,000
1957	18,000	11,000	+ 7,000
1958	14,000	9,000	+ 5,000
1959	9,000	5,000	+ 4,000
1960	8,000	7,000	+ 1,000
1961	8,000	10,000	- 2,000
1962	8,000	12,000	- 4,000
1963	7,000	18,000	-11,000
1964	7,000	15,710	- 8,710
1965	11,128	8,850	+ 2,280
1966	6,418	8,510	- 2,090
1967	9,618	7,570	+ 2,050
1968	11,864	5,650	+ 6,210
1969	10,929	5,890	+ 5,040
1970	12,227	5,890	+ 6,340
1971	14,743	5,340	+ 9,400
1972	13,966	5,150	+ 8,820
1973	9,433	7,750	+ 1,680
1974	9,649	9,050	+ 600
1975	12,425	10,500	+ 1,930

Source: Rhodesian Central Statistical Office.

Rhodesia to be their home. The whites are reluctant to forsake their high standard of living and want assurances of a commensurate living standard in their new homes. Businessmen and farmers are especially reluctant to abandon their economic stakes. Stringent controls that limit the transfer of funds abroad presently discourage a hasty departure.

Under normal circumstances, most whites would choose to resettle in South Africa. Pretoria's annual goal of 30,000 white immigrants has not been met in most recent years, and South Africa would welcome a well paced immigration from its northern neighbor. Its terrain, climate, social customs, and standard of living are similar and ties are strong. About 20 percent of Rhodesian whites were born in South Africa, and many retain South African citizenship. Nearly half of the more than 70,000 whites who have left Rhodesia in the past 10 years have emigrated there.

Rhodesian whites, however, will be increasingly reluctant to resettle in South Africa, where a worsening racial situation might force them to resettle again. Many have already resettled in Rhodesia from other African countries that have adopted majority rule. Other likely targets for emigration—where

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language, customs, and living standards are similar—include the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Australia appears to be a particularly attractive target, especially for farmers. Australian authorities are anxious to settle underpopulated parts of the outback, and the Prime Minister has indicated that his country will welcome Rhodesian immigrants.

The annual white population growth rate averaged less than 2½ percent from 1966 to 1976—1 percent from natural increase, less than 1½ percent from immigration. The natural rate has dropped dramatically from an annual 2 percent in the 1950s. (Today's 1-percent rate is comparable to that in the United States.) Although the economy has fared well in the past decade despite the UN economic sanctions, the slow population growth rate of the whites has restricted economic development and thus limited the market for semiskilled and unskilled black workers. Rhodesian blacks have been better trained to step into management positions than those in other Black African countries that have gained independence under majority rule, but increased white emigration will nonetheless further retard economic growth and increase the black unemployment rate.

A Growing Black Majority

The black population is growing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent, almost entirely from natural increase. Immigration of workers from neighboring countries is not a significant factor. This rate, comparable to those in several other African nations and among the highest in the world, has prevailed for several decades. Despite the introduction of a family planning program, it is not likely to abate in the foreseeable future. If it continues, the black population will double every two decades. Black couples in Rhodesia desire many children and see no advantage in limiting family size. They charge that it is unfair for the government to ask them to limit family size when it has encouraged whites to immigrate to fill skilled positions denied to black workers.

The Tribal Lands: Overcrowded and Deteriorating

Despite a rural black-to-white majority of more than 100 to 1, land reserved for whites is equal in area (about 18 million hectares) to that reserved for blacks. The inequity of the present division is one of the most

contentious issues between the two races. Nationalist parties have announced that a reallocation of land will have top priority in a majority administration, a result assured in any event by population pressures in the tribal areas. Of the more than 5 million blacks who live in rural areas, four-fifths are in the Tribal Trust Lands, where land is managed communally by the village, and in the Native Purchase Areas, where farmers may own individual plots. (See inset map following text.) The rest live in the white areas, where most work on the commercial farms or in the mines. The few blacks who have been permitted to settle in the white areas have no legal claim to the land.

Present land allocations have their roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. White farmers homesteaded along the roads and railroads that linked Fort Salisbury with South Africa. Blacks were forced into peripheral areas, where reserves were established for them without regard for the quality or location of the land. By the time Rhodesia had attained colonial status in 1923, about 8½ million hectares of land in small parcels had been set aside for exclusive black use. The 1931 Land Apportionment Act increased this figure, and the 1969 Land Tenure Act divided the lands as they are today.

The expansion of the tribal reserves has not been commensurate with the growth of the black population. Blacks charge that they have been shortchanged in both quantity and quality of land. The government responds that the reserves would normally be adequate to handle the tribal population but that explosive population growth and wasteful farming techniques have combined to create the current pressures.

Soils in the tribal lands are generally of poorer quality than those in the white lands. The whites argue that the tribal soils, mostly light and sandy, are better suited to the cultivation of subsistence crops by animal-drawn plows than the heavy soils in the white areas, which are productive only with the use of machinery.

The Rhodesian peasants formerly practiced shifting cultivation, permitting large tracts to be fallowed for several years. As population pressures grew, fallowing had to be abandoned and sedentary cultivation adopted. Perpetual crop cultivation and cattle grazing on sandy soils that are subjected to periodic droughts

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(yearly rainfall averages less than 28 inches) has caused serious erosion in many areas. Unless improved agricultural techniques—including the use of fertilizers, irrigation, good soil management, and mechanization—are introduced or population pressures are reduced by opening new lands to black farmers, accelerated soil deterioration will make it impossible for the tribal lands to support a growing population.

The introduction of improved farming methods would require large capital inputs and would have to overcome the conservatism of the peasant farmers. Opening up white lands to black homesteaders offers far more immediate promise for alleviating the population pressures in tribal areas. The existing compulsory division of land by race is certain to be revised or abolished under a majority government, and the movement of blacks into formerly denied land will begin.

Rhodesia's economy is heavily dependent on production from the white farms. (Tobacco, grains, cotton, coffee, tea, soya beans, and sugar cane are the chief crops.) A majority government, reluctant to disrupt commercial production, will strive to control black homesteaders. Because the white farmers practice crop rotation and fallow much of the land, their farms appear to the peasants to be underused; population pressures in the tribal lands could lead to uncontrolled migrations to these "idle" areas. Such migrations without compensation from the government would speed the exodus of white farmers from the country and could also create intertribal disputes over newly acquired land.

The Urban Townships: Crowded and Discontent

The flow of blacks to the towns and cities has increased as rural population pressures have mounted. Blacks outnumber whites in all urban areas—in Salisbury by more than 3 to 1, in Bulawayo by 4.5 to 1, in Umtali by more than 5 to 1, and in Gwelo by 5.6 to 1 (Table 2). Ratios are higher in the smaller towns. Censuses probably underestimate the black population. Many migrants arrive in the city and return to the homeland without registering on any census estimate; some black men migrate to the cities several times during their lifetime. At the same time, an increasing number of black urban dwellers have

severed their strong tribal ties and have become permanent residents.

Most urban blacks live in the townships that encircle the cities; relatively few, most of them domestic servants, are permitted to live in the urban cores. Township residents must return home each evening unless they have exemption permits. The townships are governed by the municipalities but are otherwise self-contained units with their own stores and services. Housing varies from rows of pleasant bungalows with well kept plots to sprawling blocks of crowded shanties along narrow alleys.

The municipal housing authorities have not kept up with the flood of migrants from the countryside, and inadequate housing is the rule rather than the exception. The overcrowded shantytowns have spilled over onto non-township land. Salisbury officials launched efforts in October 1976 to disperse more than 18,000 illegal squatters from white-owned land outside the city. According to government sources, the squatters had been told by black nationalists that they would be given the whites' homes with the advent of majority rule.

The townships have been quiet since the mid-1960s; urban tensions that have erupted in South Africa have not yet afflicted Rhodesia. They nonetheless remain centers of discontent and potential unrest. Even after a majority government lifts urban segregation barriers and diminishes other black grievances, severe urban problems will persist.

The Labor Force: Rising Unemployment

A climbing black unemployment rate, already a problem, is likely to worsen under a majority regime. The growth of the black labor force is outstripping the rate at which new jobs are created. From 1967 to 1974 new jobs for blacks were created at a rate of about 40,000 yearly; demographers estimate that 45,000 to 50,000 black males are entering the job market each year. A majority government will open up jobs previously denied to blacks, but this imbalance is almost certain to continue.

Rhodesian blacks have long preferred to migrate to the cities, even though housing and jobs are scarce, than to work for low wages on the plantations or in the mines. Alien workers from Malawi, Mozambique, or Zambia, more willing to accept the meager pay, were formerly recruited to fill most farm and mine

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
jobs. In recent years, Rhodesians have become less reluctant to take these jobs as urban unemployment has grown. Annual immigration and emigration of alien workers has dropped from more than 100,000 in the 1950s to only a few thousand today. About 214,000 aliens still remain in the black labor force, 23 percent of the total. Their numbers will continue to diminish under majority rule.

Outlook

Rivalries in the black nationalist movement, largely tribal-based, may grow stronger before the deadline for independence under majority rule is reached in March 1978. Tribal differences, although probably magnified by Rhodesian whites, are certain to be a critical factor in the stability of a majority government.


Although population pressures in Rhodesia are not as great as those in many African countries, they probably will be sufficient to spur migration from the tribal lands into the commercial farming areas currently reserved for whites. A new government is likely to be cautious in the reallocation of the white farmlands in order to ensure continued output from the white-run plantations. Some uncontrolled migration can be expected, however, and it will hasten the departure of white farmers and reduce agricultural production.

Migration to the cities—a worldwide phenomena—will continue under a majority government and urban problems will mount. Such problems are containable, however, and are not likely to pose an immediate threat to the new government.



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
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